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The Republic of Salé (1627–1641/1666); an alternative pirate organization model?

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ABSTRACT

Critical management authors are constantly searching for alternative models. We could learn from the study of the functioning of pirate communities, for example. It would have been important for the critical authors to have an example of a real pirate city organized under libertarian principles, such as the Republic of Salé (1627–1641/1666). Unfortunately, the study of this case, based on historical sources, shows that it was not an ideal pirate city, but rather a maritime city state, a plutocracy, inserted in national and international trade networks. Even when demythologized, the pirate utopia remains a fascinating part of our collective imaginary and thus could provide us with solutions to the limitations of existing models. One could, however, say that fully assumed fiction would have more impact than this false reality to which is attributed things that did not even exist.

KEYWORDS

Republic of Salé; pirates; alternative management; utopias; anarchists; micro-history

Introduction

There is a growing debate, initiated by 'critical management studies', on the subject of alternative forms of organization (Grey and Willmott 2005). We are supposed to learn other ways of governance, management, and the redistribution of wealth from the study of such communities as street gangs, mafias, religious communities, …, and pirates (Parker 2002a, 2008; Kostera 2008). Even if pirates did not all live on ships, as there were also pirates on land (especially, across national borders or hijackers of cars and other means of transport), it is above all the pirates of the seas that have marked our imaginations the most. This is mainly due to the images we have of Atlantic pirates at sea in the Golden Age of buccaneering, roughly in the second half of the seventeenth century (1650–1725), associated with the Caribbean archipelago and based on three centuries of ballads, melodramas, poems, films, and romantic novels as well as the two classics of pirate lore: treasure Island (1883) by Robert-Louis Stevenson and Peter Pan (1904) by James Mathew Barrie.

Many critical historians such as Hill (1986), Rediker (2004), Lamborn Wilson[1] (1995), Snelders (2005), Kuhn (2010), Rediker and Linebaugh (2000), Woodard (2007) and other inputs to critical management studies, present these pirates as libertarian rebels, proto-anarchists whose motivation was the search for an alternative lifestyle, fighting 'for God and

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liberty' under a black flag.[2] These Pirates might be a source of innovation in management theory, inspiring it at several levels: It offers a different perspective on understanding capitalism, as pirate organizations were 'operating from the fringes of capitalism to contest the sovereign's norms in the name of a public cause' (Durand and Vergne 2012, 266), a way of challenging dominant models, based on new forms of piracy such as cyber-utopians, cyber-anarchists (Parker 2009), and a source of alternative social/organization models with a democratic managerial organization (Lamborn Wilson 1995; Rediker and Linebaugh 2000; Parker 2002a, 2002b, 2008, 2009, 2012; Reedy 2002; Alvesson and Willmott 2003; Rediker 2004).

Historians who have looked at primary sources from Spanish and English archives about the pirates of the Golden Age in the Caribbean (1650–1725) do not, however, all have the same vision (Gosse 1932; Haring 1966; Andrews 1978; Cordingly 1995; Earle 2003). Their interpretations do not embrace the romantic claims of piracy as an emerging class of social bandits due to imperial rivalry, as suggested by Marxist historians (Hobsbawm 1969; Bromly 1985; Hill 1986; Thompson 1994), a maritime class, reacting to a new and oppressive work regimes, going so far as to consider pirates as dangerous criminal opportunists (Earle 2003). Others, like Thomson (1994), Latimer (2009) or Leeson (2007, 2009), based on the same sources, argue that pirates were only rational economic actors.

In spite of these different views, it nevertheless remains difficult for critical historians to find local primary sources that validate their theory concerning the organization of pirates of the golden age of Caribbean piracy (1650–1725). Although part of the 'alter' and utopian literature about pirates claims to be based on sound historical evidence, most of the writings about pirates and buccaneers rely on utopias, as pirates have left no archives:

> And yet we know nothing and the library is empty. This is because if piracy is brought to life by history, all it wants is to get rid of history. When pirates take to the sea, aren't they fleeing history at full sail. Lapouge 1987, 20)

Some pirates have written their memoirs and there are numerous stories of captured sailors and travelers, as well as the records of interrogations of captured pirates, and of their confessions before execution. Nevertheless, a large part of these books is a mixture of fact and fiction and heavily impregnated by interpretation, ideology, or even fantasy. Although part of the 'alter' and utopian literature about pirates claims to rely on sound historical evidence, many of these stories fail to present specific sources or even to set the analysis in time and space, while creating general myths about piracy. For example, the two main sources of reference commonly used are romanticized stories that are more or less made up. The 'History of the adventurous buccaneers reported in India containing their remarkable deeds for the last twenty years, with the life, manners and customs of the buccaneers and inhabitants of S. Domingo and Tortuga', published in Amsterdam in 1678 and authored by Alexander Olivier Exquemelin[3] (Exquemelin 2000) is partly fiction[4]. The other reference, the book of Captain Thomas Johnson (presumably a pseudonym of Daniel Defoe[5]): 'A General History of the Robberies and Murders of The Most Notorious Pyrates' published in two volumes, the first in 1724 and the second in 1728 (Johnson 2002) of which there were 70 issues in 4 languages, is a fictional narrative. The 'pirate cities' of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries like Tortuga off the north coast of Haiti (Hispaniola), Port-Royal in the south of Jamaica and New Providence in the Bahamas were merely 'frontier towns' and not really pirate cities, apart from Libertalia in Madagascar. This city, which in fact only appears in the second volume of

'A General History of the Robberies and Murders of The Most Notorious Pyrates', published in 1728 (cf. supra), is however, completely imaginary.[6]

It would therefore have been important for the critical authors, to have an example of a real pirate city organized under libertarian principles, an ideal city; a pirate utopia. Lamborn Wilson (1995) referred to the seventeenth-century episode of the pirate Republic of Salé (1627–1641/1666), engaged in privateering, and established at the mouth of Bou Regreg river in Morocco (now Rabat) in a similar region and at the same time as the golden age of the pirates of the Caribbean (1650–1730), but whose existence can be proven. The Republic of Salé was formed by three cities: Salé-le-Neuf (the present-day Rabat), Kasbah or Qasba (now a district of Rabat), and Salé-le-Vieux (now Salé). It is mentioned in many historical sources and writings, mainly of Moroccan, French, or Spanish origin (Coindreau 1948; Caillé 1949; Gozalbes Busto 1974; Maziane 1999, 2007; Hamili 2002; Bouzineb 2006), and American (Bookin-Weiner 1990). Also, in the collective imaginary, the 'pirates of Salé' are well known from the book of Daniel Defoe published in 1719: 'The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Robinson Crusoe of York, Mariner[7]' (Defoe 1972). It was inspired by a true story, when Crusoe was kept as a slave by a Salé pirate for two years before escaping. In addition, the pirates of Salé represented a constant threat for the Atlantic coasts and navigation and have thus left a mark on European collective memory.

According to Lamborn Wilson (1995), this Republic is an example of a pirate community 'not just a pirate hang-out or safe harbour, but a pirate utopia, a planned structure for a privateer[8] society' (1995, 17). This perspective was echoed by other authors, like Parker (2009, 2012), and in the 'Dictionary of Alternatives: Utopianism and Organization' (Parker, Fournier, and Reedy 2007) under 'Pirate Utopia', as well as in many libertarian websites. To back up what he says, apart from some reports by the English emissary John Harrisson, who he presents as an 'English Agent 007' and also referred to by De Castries (1935), Lamborn Wilson (1995) mainly used some secondary historic sources (Caillé 1949; Coindreau 1948; Dan [1637] 1649; Brown 1971; essentially Mouette 1683). Proclaiming himself as a 'piratologist', he nevertheless admits that his presentation partly relies on his imagination and a touch of fantasy (1995, 187).

While there are many recent historical works about the Barbary pirates (Earle 1970; Fisher 1974; Fontenay 1988; Bono 1998), these authors hardly mentioned Morocco and its pirates. A PhD thesis on maritime history allows these gaps to be filled by revisiting the 'republican' period of Salé (1627–1641/1666) and examining the workings of its organization, mainly on the basis of primary historical sources that have not been considered by critical authors.

Therefore, our research question, according to our historical sources, is as follows: Was the Republic of Salé really a pirate Republic or simply the 'romantic' interpretations made by some left-wing historians and critical management studies writers? This will help to address some other research questions: (1) Historical truth versus imagination, pamphlet, or even ideological interpretation in history: Why does historical 'truth' matter? (2) Is history simply just another form of narration which is no more real than a novel or a utopia? (3) How can a study of utopia be useful for management?

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we begin in the first part with a review of the literature on pirate organizations and on the reports made by its supporters about the Pirate Republic of Salé. We continue in the second part with a presentation of the main features of the Republic of Salé, based on historical evidence. Finally, the third part of the paper will introduce our discussion.

Pirate utopias as alternative social and organization models

Piracy lends itself to utopias. Its golden age is set between 1650 and 1725 in the Caribbean islands. Pirates are often considered as libertarian rebels and anarchists searching for an alternative way of life (Lamborn Wilson 1995; Rediker and Linebaugh 2000; Rediker 2004; Land 2007). These authors often refer to the writings of Christopher Hill (1986), identifying the 'intellectual' origins of these pirates in the revolutionary anarchist movements of seventeenth-century England. Some of the Diggers, Ranters, Muggletonians, and Fifth Monarchists (Hill 1986) were sent after the 1640 Civil War to the penitentiary colonies in the Americas, or fled to the Caribbean, where they joined, and ideologically inspired local pirates. While painting pirates as anarchists fighting under a black flag 'for God and liberty', this utopia could in fact be an echo of Defoe's views on social and economic progress, as depicted, for instance, in 'An Essay upon Projects' in 1697 (Defoe 1887). He describes his time as a 'Projecting Age' and illustrates plans for the economic and social improvement of England, including an early proposal for a national insurance scheme as well as publishing other contemporary essays and pamphlets. Pirates are presented as 'Robin Hood's merry men', who fight against the injustices of sea trading, denouncing the wage system that is specific to a capitalistic accumulation process. Moreover, the symbolic resemblance of the black flag (the Jolly Roger) with the flag of anarchy enhances the assimilation of piracy and rebellion, leading to the following: a practice of direct action, the construction of an alternative social order with a code of honor, a brotherhood where decisions were made collectively, solidarity, and internationalism arising from the refusal of nationalism:

> Away from empires, free from persecution, there was, facing the Atlantic, this refuge of the pirates of the seas, this prosperous city, cosmopolitan and sophisticated, with singularly egalitarian institutions for that time. Lamborn Wilson 1995, 6)

They allegedly lived in communities based on a libertarian form of egalitarian democracy, long before the French revolution, creating 'mini-anarchies' where there was a genuine radicalism hostile to class separation: a 'multi-ethnic mix of rebellious proletarians' (Do or Die[9] 2005, 10). Pirate communities were based on solidarity and fraternity in contrast to what used to happen on the regular ships (in the navy at least), where the crew had often been press-ganged and were usually commanded by the privileged classes, the captains often mistreating their crews:

> No man will be a sailor who has contrivance enough to get himself into a jail; for being in a ship is being in a jail, with the chance of being drowned … a man in a jail has more room, better food, and commonly better company. (Doctor Johnson, quoted by Boswell 1791, 86)

Wages were low and irregular, the food was horrible, the death rate was high owing to the unsanitary living conditions and the risks involved in their work. They were also subject to very harsh discipline, with cruel punishments (such as the fetters, flogging, or keelhauling (which was often fatal) dished out by sometimes sadistic captains.

Inversely, pirates would sign a 'contract' or 'pirate code' (the Chasse-Partie) for each ship or even for each expedition. Indeed, pirate life was in a way quite the opposite of anarchy,[10] being supposedly organized according to articles of agreement on which there are ample but only secondary sources based on first-hand accounts, such as the work of Exquemelin or Defoe (cf supra). In addition to this contractual basis of pirate society, it is said that the captain was elected by all members of the crew and was answerable to the crew. He could be removed and his authority was offset by another elected officer, 'the quartermaster'. On

the ship, social status had no place, nicknames replaced Christian names, and discussing one's origins was forbidden. All men were equal, irrespective of their faith, race, or gender (Earle 2003), even if the marginal role of women and the problem of how the slaves captured during their raids were treated (freed by some pirates, or traded by others) somewhat tarnishes this idealistic image. Decisions on policy and disciplinary punishment were taken democratically. The wage ratio was abolished and the distribution of profits was based on skills and roles, thus simply reproducing the system they were familiar with from their previous experiences at sea. It is the most common method of payment for fishing crews (Villiers 1998), still in use in France. The captain and the quartermaster received between one and a half and two units, the gunners, the boatswain, the carpenters and the doctors between a unit and a quarter and a unit and a half, while all the others received one unit. According to Rediker (2004) pirates were also the early inventors of 'social security', having put in place a mutual fund to help disabled men wounded in combat. We nevertheless have to remember that this type of welfare system had already existed in France under the Ancien Régime, for example.[11] Some organizations could learn from the democratic managerial organization of the pirates.

The functioning of the Republic of Salé according to the supporters of a Pirate Republic (1627–1641/1666)

According to Lamborn Wilson (1995) echoed by other authors, including Parker (2009) and the 'Dictionary of Alternatives' (Parker, Fournier, and Reedy 2007) under the entry 'Pirate Utopia', the pirate Republic of Salé in the seventeenth century, also called the 'Republic of Bou Regreg' was an example of a pirate community: a 'hydrarchy'. In libertarian literature, this term designates the new social order and organization put in place by pirates during their sea voyages.

This political experiment results, in his opinion, from the arrival of the Moriscos[12] (also called Andalusians) that had been banished from Spain, mainly from the Hornachos region (Hornacheros) and of 'lawless' European (Dutch and English) renegades in Salé in the early years of the seventeenth century. Thus, a republic pirate city was created outside the administrative control of Istanbul, in contrast with the regencies of the Barbary Coast, like Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli.[13] It was said that the Salé pirate ships were governed by a democratic and libertarian system, similar to the Chasse-Parties of the pirates of the Caribbean. In the city, there reigned an independent political organization and a more democratic system than these regencies, at least until 1666. The crews and cities were a melting pot of African people, Jews, Moriscos, renegades, and Christians, all kinds of free people, where anyone could become a hero and have access to power, for instance, in the case of the Dutch renegade Morat Raïs.[14] His story illustrates a type of harmonious interracial life, involving class solidarity, lack of government, and an adventurous life (Lamborn Wilson 1995). From his perspective, the Republic of Salé, was the only state ever founded on allegedly egalitarian principles (Lamborn Wilson 1995). For this author, who describes himself as an 'ontological anarchist', the Republic of Salé is a so-called TAZ (Temporary Autonomous Zone) which he defines as follows:

> From the pirates' utopia of the 17th Century to the global expanse of this century, a TAZ manifests itself to he who can see it, 'appearing – disappearing' to avoid detection by the State. It occupies a place in space, in time, or in your mind and dissolves the moment it has been recorded.

> The TAZ flees already established TAZs, the places ‘conceded’ to Liberty. It is an ‘insurrection’ outside Time and History, a tactic of disappearance. (Lamborn Wilson 1997, back cover)

Method and sources

We aim in this paper to revisit the Republic of Salé through various historical sources and attempt to detect what was real about this social experiment. We are quite aware that this is not an easy goal to accomplish. We have used the historical critical method that involves comparing a maximum number of sources without ever taking them at face value (Prost 1996). A wide variety of sources was used in this study. These include insufficient Moroccan sources (chronicles, annals, travelers’ accounts, legal literature, Kunnâch registers of past accounts, etc.). As they only shed light on the later periods whose pertinence is limited, they fail to answer all the questions raised by such a complex movement as that of the Salé privateers in the seventeenth century.

To research the subject in as much depth as possible, we were forced to resort to European sources that provide much greater insight to the question. First hand sources, most of which are French (French navy archives found in the National Archives), Spanish (National Archives of Madrid and the General Archives of Simancas), Dutch (State Archives in The Hague; Algemeen Rijksarchief), or English (Sources Inédites de l’Histoire du Maroc Volumes 1–3) provide many pieces of interest that form the backbone of this paper. These invaluable sources of information provide insight into a past that no Moroccan texts can give with regard to the period we are interested in. We have correspondence, memoirs, reports, logs, lists of privateer ships, their types, captains and crews, Ijâzat or Barâat passports, the roles of their captives and slaves, their origins, profiles, the price put on their heads, the cost of the redemption campaigns, truces and peace treaties, or trading agreements between Salé and the various European powers of the modern age. Vast amounts of source material were in printed form.[15] We selected the most powerful accounts, especially those concerning the trading of ‘human chattel’, i.e. captives with all that this implies for the ‘economy of ransoms’ in the Moroccan ports of Salé and Tetouan. These writings must of course be used with care in view of their partisan nature, combined with a crusading spirit that was accentuated by the thorny question of redeeming the souls of the captives. These accounts must be considered in light of their origins. With the exception of some traders or diplomatic envoys (Frejus 1670; Pidou De Saint-Olon 1694), who left some tangible traces of their time in Morocco, it is the accounts by Christians taken prisoner by the Salé privateers (Dunton 1637; Gallonye 1680; Mouette 1683, 1683; Ockley 1726; Ter Meetelen 1956) or by monks of the Trinitarian or Mercederian orders (Dan [1637] 1649; D’Angers 1644; Desmay 1682), who, owing to their faith or on the orders of the European Governments, attempted to free them, which are the most interesting.

Among printed source material, are the Sources Inédites de l’Histoire de Maroc (SIHM), published by Henry de Castries from 1905 until his death in 1927, and continued by Pierre de Cénival who also died in 1937, then by Robert Ricard, Philippe de Cossé Brissac, and Chantal de La Véronne. The 27 volumes of this collection are a mine of information. In two series, they reproduce thousands of documents of all kinds (letters from ambassadors, merchants, or prisoners, as well as correspondence between the kings of England and France, the States General of the Netherlands, the governors, the chiefs of Salé, the princes and

sultans of Morocco) from various holdings in Europe, accompanied with highly informative notes or even specific scholarly studies.

This mass of documents has helped us to understand the structural changes and the mechanisms of all aspects of privateering, from recruiting to life at sea, as well as the economic, political, social, and religious organization of this North African Atlantic seaport in the seventeenth century. We have not explored the question of sexual liberty which we considered outside our scope, although it is widely discussed by some radical authors, including Lamborn Wilson (1995).

Findings: the reality beyond the utopia?

While in the collective imagination, we mainly have an image of pirates on board an isolated ship, there were sometimes connections between crews and ships[16] and between ships and towns just like those between the privateers[17] and their towns such as Saint-Malo or Dunkerque. This upholds the idea of a proto-democratic community moving onto the land (Parker 2009), as was also the case of the Republic of Salé.

Aboard the ship, a democratic organization?

The democratic and egalitarian organization on board the pirate ships in the form of the Chasse-Partie was not reproduced on the Salé privateer ships where the organization of the society at sea depended upon the social hierarchy ashore and upon the technology present aboard.

Types of ships; a technological revolution

The privateers of Salé transformed their navigation techniques, due to their contact with Europeans. The port of Salé was influenced by its location, being situated at the edge of the Atlantic, and at the mouth of Bou Regreg, therefore having specific material constraints. The turbulent waters of the Atlantic coast off Morocco which had few sheltered bays, and mainly estuaries protected by ever-shifting sand bars, explain the small number of ports in this region. Access to the port of Salé was particularly dangerous and required small boats with a low freeboard. Heavy galleons were not therefore suitable for the Atlantic ports. The transfer of technology was brought about by Europeans who had converted to Islam and settled in Salé, thus gaining potential access even to the highest offices. We give here the example of Simon Danser, a Dutchman from Dordrecht (also known as Alî Raïs), who was called the 'benefactor of privateers',[18] after having taught the 'Algierians' in 1606 how to build and operate the round vessels.[19] Under their influence, galleys[20] were partly abandoned in favor of sailing ships, which in turn had an impact on the roles and status aboard the ships. Fewer slaves at the oars did not mean equality of status but only a kind of egalitarianism concerning food and lodging because of the technical constraints linked to the small size of the vessels.

Organization aboard the ship

The captain, generally a renegade or a Hornachero, was either the owner of the ship, or was appointed by the ship owner. The ship's crew was composed of Andalusians, captive Christians, black slaves, renegades, or, to a very limited extent, native Muslims. During

boarding, captives and slaves were chained to prevent escape or revolt. Although this was not the modus operandi of pirates, a sort of egalitarianism reined aboard the ships. Life on board the Salé privateer ships for the officers was the same as for their crews; it was austere and without distinction.[21] The distribution of all gains was based on religious law. On arrival in the port of Salé, an attendant (shâwush) would make an inventory before putting the goods up for auction; a canonical 'fifth' was taken from the result of the sale which varied from 1/5 to 1/8 of the catch. The remainder was distributed as follows: 10% to the government of Salé, the Divan (Diwan)[22]; 50% of the remaining amount to the owner; 1% for the food of the marabouts (religious leaders); 1% for the maintenance of the port; 10–15 units for the ra'is (ruler of the city), 3 units each for the pilot officer, the master gunner, and the surgeon; 2 units each for the quartermaster, boatswain, and gunner, and 1 unit for the rest (Dan [1637] 1649, 62). In addition, the captain took the clothing of the captured captain, leaving the other parts of the loot to his crew, with the exception of the merchandise. It is important to note that the Salé ships did not belong to their crews and only rarely to the captains, but usually to rich Hornacheros or Andalusians. Some ship-owning companies were set up and shared their profits according to the amounts invested by their shareholders.

Pirates, privateers, or Mûjâhidin on the sea?

Apart from the rules governing life on board ship and the ownership of the ships, which were close to those of the merchant ships or privateers of that time, in terms of their legal status, can we speak of pirates or privateers? While raiding was born in the Middle Ages in the context of permanent wars, the distinction between pirates and privateers, between an isolated act of banditry and an authorized act of war, one that was even encouraged by a public authority, was institutionalized in the Atlantic from the twelfth century (Villiers 2000). It was necessary for states, cities, and princes to be in open war and the privateer captain to be recognized by them and be in possession of a letter of marque or a commercial raiding commission. The merchant ships thus could wage war at sea, allowing the sovereign to raise a war fleet against the enemy without having to provide the necessary capital. Piracy was at that time an unauthorized form of war, an attack on any ship flying any flag. In the fifteenth century, however, the status of the privateer was gradually codified. In France the main regulations for this was Colbert's Ordinance of 1681 imposing a series of rules, namely the possession of a commission or letter of marque[23] for a period of several months, which authorized privateers to practice commercial raiding, according to various conditions which included displaying the flag of the country, bringing the vessel back to its home port, passing through a prize court, and paying 10% of profits to the king. In Salé, commercial raiding was controlled by the Republic and directed against its enemies with permission from the authorities. The ships could not go to sea without being in possession of a special commission from (a) the Admiral of Salé or from the government. They were also sometimes provided with a letter of marque issued by friendly foreign nations.

Intermingled with these considerations is the concept of maritime Jihad. While the difference between pirate or privateer has been discussed for a long time, the question is even more complex when we are talking about Barbary pirates[24]: 'history cannot claim to be impartial on the question of privateers, especially when they were from the Barbary coast' (Hubac 1949, 97). Use of the term holy war or the religious revenge of the Moriscos is not, however, enough for commercial raiding to be considered as a jihad as Amili (1989) argues, a jihad being a 'fardh', i.e. an obligation. It was quite natural for Muslim societies in the

seventeenth century to give all actions a religious explanation or connection, but privateering was basically only a trade-related business, whether marginal or regular. Without trading there would have been no raiding, and there was no raiding without a commercial purpose. Barbary commercial raiding was an ambivalent activity at the crossroads of economic, religious, and political–military phenomena. At least as far as the people of Salé were concerned, the objective of the ship owners who invested their capital was to engage in a form of market speculation aimed at making a profit by the sale of the booty seized from the European Christian enemy. It was the hope of gain that urged the Hornachero shipowners freshly installed on the banks of the Bou Regreg to attack the Spanish merchant ships. Their fierceness can be explained by the magnitude of their grievances and by their desire to recover by any means the property abandoned in Europe rather than by any religious motivation. (b) It is true that they eventually also attacked the interests of other European maritime nations, as there were bigger profits to be made there.

We therefore consider the Salé corso ships only as privateers as much for the above reason as for the type of relations on board the vessels, which were much different from those of pirates or the relations the crews had with the capitalist shipowners.

The Republic of Salé (1627–1641/1666), a conjunction of three pirate cities?

Lamborn Wilson (1995, 81), presents the Republic of Salé as 'three Republics involved in the corsair trade … feuding incessantly with each other but teaming up for razias …'. In reality, we think that things were quite different.

The origins of the Republic of Salé

They are related to the arrival of Spanish Muslims (Moriscos). Having already found in Salé an established commercial raiding activity (Dan [1637] 1649), these populations managed to establish a fleet for raiding the Christian merchant ships and to create an autonomous government considered by French and Moroccan historians as a Republic. On the eve of the installation of the Moriscos in the early seventeenth century, there were two distinctive areas:

- Salé, on the right bank of the river
- Ribat al-Fath, on the left bank (an old fortress that became the Kasbah)

After the Spanish *Reconquista*, that is to say the reconquering of the Muslim kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula by the Christian kings, came the publication of the edicts of expulsion given by Philip III of Spain (from 22 September 1609 to 18 January 1610) which ordered the deportation of all those who, for whatever reason or period of time, had been Muslims (Conrad 1999). These were the Moriscos. The total number of people that abandoned Spain was about half a million. Among them, the so-called Hornacheros (2000–3000 people) known for their wealth and entrepreneurial spirit. They came from Hornachos, in Extremadura, around 290 km south of Madrid. They were different from other Moriscos. Even in their home town of Hornachos, they already had a particular status. There they had already formed a (c) kind of republic with the right to bear arms (Marc 1977; Brault-Noble and Marc 1979; Bennassar 1985). They had their own administrative system and a Council that met in a cave in the nearby mountains, used fake currency, and had the privilege of carrying weapons. Unlike the Moriscos, they remained deeply Muslim despite the repression of the Inquisition (Marc 1977) and continued to speak Castilian. They had escaped the first expulsions by means

of bribery and corruption, but were unable to avoid those of 1609. They finally left from the port of Seville and set sail at the end of January 1609 for the Moroccan coast. Arriving in Salé with most of their valuables and money, Sultan Mulay Zidan gave them the Kasbah of Salé (d) for reasons of domestic policy. Formidable and highly disciplined warriors, the Hornacheros settled on the left bank of the Bou Regreg River with the purpose of satisfying their ambitions as well as their hatred of the Spanish and the Portuguese.

Once installed in the Kasbah with their families, they set to rebuilding the ruined houses and repaired the fortifications, leaving openings for cannon. In a move to strengthen their presence and increase their fighting force, they invited around 6000 Moriscos to join them. They were the true victims of the Spanish expulsion orders. In contrast to the Hornacheros, they had been obliged to leave all their possessions behind, and even pay the cost of their passage. The Hornacheros allowed them to settle close to the Kasbah, in what was to become the Medina of Rabat (New Salé). From there they were able to establish an 'industrial' privateer fleet. Having found well-developed raiding activities already in place (Dan [1637] 1649), they soon became the great leaders of Jihad on the sea and started controlling politics and trade. Well located a few kilometers from the Strait of Gibraltar, for the Hornacheros Salé was the ideal place from which to seek their revenge, as from the port they were able to watch the Spanish ships coming from the New World. They also pillaged Dutch ships coming from Indonesia, bringing gold, spices, and slaves, and ships from other European countries according to their alliances. The Hornacheros rapidly emancipated themselves from the authority of the Sultan and the marabouts and set up in 1627 a form of self-government that is considered by most historians as a Republic, recognized from the start by the English crown. This government is no other than an exact replica of what they had in Hornachos. The executive power lay with a governor or chief who was elected each year, and was assisted by a council or Divan of 16 elected members. Their legal system was based on Andalusian customs, justice being dealt out by two *cadis* (Muslim judges settling civil, legal, and religious matters) of Spanish origin. They carried out many raids that took them from the Atlantic archipelagos to the north of Cornwall and even the Nordic countries. They plundered and seized fishing and commercial vessels, capturing the crew, and they also raided the coasts in order to take prisoners. They were assisted by many renegades, mainly Dutch, who were (e) skilled seamen.

The Republic of Salé thus became a privateer port which offered the institutions, financial and military structures for any privateer wishing to settle there.

The history of the Republic of Salé (f)

There were barely three or four intervals of a few years of peace (Caillé 1949). However, the primary cause of the quarrels is to be found in the relations between Andalusians and Hornacheros and the native population of Salé. The conflicts were sometimes related to minor issues, like sharing customs duties, or more political questions, like the sharing of power in the system of governance. At the beginning of the republic, the Hornacheros, who came to Morocco with all their riches, behaved as absolute masters, by keeping all the resources (customs revenue, income from piracy) from all the three cities. The Andalusians, however, of which there were greater numbers, wanted their share of the wealth; they fortified their city, and asked to take part in the government. The Hornacheros answered with cannon fire to all these requests. Again, in March 1630 the Andalusians, frustrated by the (g) fact that they got no part of the customs revenues, and encouraged by Sidi el-Ayachi,[25] the

marabout of old Salé, besieged the Kasbah. The British Consul John Harrison intervened and peace was restored in May. From that moment on, the Republic of Salé shared the income from captured goods and customs as well as the governing power. Andalusians and Hornacheros each elected their own chief, but in fact the Kasbah maintained all its former authority. (h)

In January 1631, peace was precarious. This time the marabout Sidi el-Ayachi tried to take the Kasbah, bombarded it, but the blockade failed and was lifted in October 1632. During a new revolt in 1636, the Andalusians devised a stratagem to capture the Kasbah, chased away the Hornacheros, tried to conquer old Salé and blockaded it in January–February 1637. Its inhabitants called for Sidi el-Ayachi who, with the assistance of the British squadron of Admiral Rainsborough, came in 1637, bombed the Kasbah and blockaded it from the sea. But, after the release of all the British prisoners, Rainsborough withdrew, Sidi el-Ayachi gave up the fight and the Hornacheros, allied with the Andalusians, recovered their city in 1638.

Later still, in 1641, the Dilaïtes[26] took power over both Hornacheros and Andalusians, after having assassinated El-Ayachi. Under the reign of the Alaouite dynasty in 1660s, the cities revolted against the Dilaïtes, but Sultan Moulay er Rechid (1664–1641/1672)[27] managed to restore his authority in 1666.

The end of the adventure of the Republic of Salé cannot be clearly dated. While 1641 could be considered as the date of its demise, the three towns came under the non-aggressive rule of the Dila brotherhood which was tantamount to independence. It was only in 1666 that they fell under the authority of the Alaouite sharifs. (i)

Context of the development of the republic of Salé

Its development became possible as a result of a favorable national and international environment (Weiner 1976). Internally, Morocco was going through a period of political crisis, which opened the way for emancipation from the authority of the Sultans. From the end of the reign of Ahmed El-Mansour in 1603, it was not until the reign of Moulay Rachid (1664–1672) and the installation of the Alaouite dynasty that peace was settled, authority restored and the Moroccan State reconstituted. Located on the Atlantic seaboard away from the Mediterranean 'corso'[28] (Fontenay 2010), and far away from Turkish rule, the wars in which the European powers were engaged gave the Salé privateers the freedom to carry out their 'trading' at their leisure: The major European powers were at war and facing internal difficulties, weakening their ability to counter the pirates. Two major political and religious conflicts occupied the first half of the seventeenth century: The 'Thirty Years' War' that tore Europe apart between 1618 and 1659[29] and the last part of the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648) between Spain and the provinces, now the Netherlands, which gained their independence under the name of the United Provinces. The pirates of Salé have always taken advantage of the rivalry between Europeans by signing treaties with some of them and making war on others, and each treaty of peace or friendship stipulated the supply of naval equipment, guns, powder, and cannon balls.

It is not therefore a single united city we are dealing with. Taking advantage of weakened European powers and of the central governing power of Morocco, the Hornacheros driven out of Spain settled in the Kasbah at the mouth of the Bou Regreg River in the seventeenth century, and had the role of political and economic capital while controlling privateering activities and the port. Their nostalgia for their lost homeland can be an explanation for their political, military, and economic ambitions. Sometimes arbitrated by the naval expeditions (j)

of Europeans (the Dutch, Spanish, and English being particularly active), incessant quarrels took place between the three cities and, within the cities, between some of the different communities. Thus, the Salé Republic corresponds to three opposing cities with different destinies. Three different worlds, each having its own government:

- The Kasbah (qasba), a walled city held by the Hornacheros, which is in present times a district of Rabat;
- New Salé (currently Rabat) populated by the Moriscos;
- Old Salé, the pious city, a city of saints and marabouts, holy tombs and shrines. It is independent and often engaged in holy war (jihad).

Plan of Salé in the late seventeenth century (taken from Maziane 2007, 82).

The Republic of Salé: a real pirate city?

Lamborn Wilson presents us a vision of Salé as a TAZ, 'a renegado community' (1995, 81), a hydrarchy, a real pirate city organized under libertarian principles, with a harmonious interracial community life, involving class solidarity and 'governed by a divan or council of Corsair Captains' (Lamborn Wilson 1995, 17). In the three cities and mainly on the southern bank of the Bou Regreg River, lived alongside the indigenous population (the original Muslim population) some more or less heterogeneous communities (Moriscos, Christians, Renegades, Jews, blacks, women, prisoners, and slaves). What do we know about these communities and their organization?

Government – This republic was governed by chiefs who were elected by Muslim men only, assisted by a 'Divan' composed of elected members. Old Salé nevertheless remained under the control of the marabouts and had an independent administrative system most of the time. The balance of Hornacheros and Andalusians among the chiefs and members of the Divan in New Salé was, however, the source of many conflicts or even civil war, encouraged by the marabous of Old Salé, the Sultan and the European powers. Many of these chiefs and members of the Divan were also from some of Salé's most powerful Hornachero families, (k) which thus formed a real plutocracy (Coindreau 1948).

Muslims

Within the Muslim population there are two distinct groups, the Moriscos and the Hornacheros (l) who were the political and financial elite of Salé. Those who would be called the Moriscos or Andalusians, were mostly artisans or small traders. They were both defined by a strong commitment to their faith, nostalgia for their lost homeland, desire for revenge, but also a wish to organize themselves. The Muslims of old Salé nevertheless had no regard for these newcomers. They were not well accepted by the surrounding populations because their culture and language were foreign to the still medieval Morocco. In 1637, Sidi al-Ayachi, in his treaty with Charles I, asked his English allies to block New Salé until he had succeeded in securing the submission of the 'small band of infidels who have strayed and separated from the Orthodox religion … . until they return to the community of Muslims and conform their practices to that of the latter'.[30]

Renegades

These were Christians who had renounced their faith and converted to Islam (Bennassar and (m) Bennassar 1989). Called renegades (or *Renegados*) because of this conversion, they were thousands to have fled Europe and settled in Salé, but also in Algiers or Tunis (Bennassar and Bennassar 1989). The city of Salé was a safe haven for them, for a variety of reasons: fear of punishment, greed, power, ambition, libertarianism, or fear of being bought back. The great social mobility, even up to the level of captain or admiral, attracted dynamic newcomers and gave the impression that the renegades formed the dominant group of the maritime cities. They often took the jobs of steward, doctor, surgeon, carpenter, etc. It is worth mentioning some remarkable positions that were held by renegades within the palace, some being ship owners, and even captains, like the ra'is Morat Rais, a renegade Dutch captain appointed admiral of Salé in 1624 and first governor of the city in 1627, and who became commander of the castle of Oualidiya in the Kasbah in 1640. The renegades nevertheless

continued to be despised by their former coreligionists The pious people of old Salé had always doubted the faith of the converts, calling them the 'Christians of Castille',[31]: (n)

> These renegades do not shine, in general, by their virtues. The reasons for their conversion to Islam, unrelated to any religious evolution, were numerous and ranged from fear to ambition. (Dan [1637] 1649, 314)

They were also despised by the other communities: 'The Jews, the Moors and the Christians despise them to the point that when someone dies, he must be buried by his colleagues or else remain unburied. Their cemetery is separated from those of the Moors, Jews and Christians: Muslims have such a low opinion of the renegades that they say that they will not go into Paradise …'[32]

They therefore had their own district, separated from those of the Moriscos, Christians, and Jews.

Christians

Two types of Christians settled in Salé. Some were free: traders, members of the diplomatic corps, missionaries, religious communities, merchants. But others were prisoners captured during raids in Europe or attacks on their ships (Dan [1637] 1649; Davis 2003; Chebel 2007). There were about 800 people captured every year. They were both men and women, even children, wealthy citizens, priests, shipowners, merchants, noblemen, captains, but also sailors, craftsmen, and farmers. Their origin was mainly Spanish, but also Portuguese, French, or English. The duration of captivity ranged from a few years to 30 years and more as part of a veritable economy of ransom (Bono 1998; Kaiser 2008; Fontenay 2010).

Jews

Besides those who were long established, like the Judeo-Arabs and Judeo-Berbers, there were some who had been expelled from Spain. These expulsions would incite about 150,000 of them to prefer the maritime cities where they were able to integrate into the world of traders and craftsmen thanks to the existing networks between their communities established in Europe, mainly in the Netherlands and in the ports of the Mediterranean basin. Their community was administered by a specific leader from the group. (o)

Black people

Captured during raids in sub-Saharan Africa (N'Diaye 2008) or taken during the capture of slave ships, black people had the legal status of slave or freeman. They were, however, usually sailors or soldiers (the Abîd al-Bûkâri, the black militia of the Sultans) and some could even be appointed to important administrative positions.

Women

There is no trace of the presence of women on ships, or in the governing bodies, excepting the story of Sitt Al-Hurra. Born in 1493 to a Spanish mother and a Muslim father, after the death of her husband in 1537 she became the Queen of Tetouan at the age of 42. It was from that moment on that she went into 'piracy' and became an ally of the Turkish corsair of Algiers, Barbarossa. She became one of the most important Muslim female figures of the Western Islamic area. As ruler of Tetouan for nearly 30 years, she was in charge of a major sea trade and of privateering companies in the western Mediterranean.

Slaves and captives

Slavery in Africa was a general and common practice until the mid-eighteenth century, and its final abolishment in the mid-nineteenth century. Besides the black slaves, Christian captives represented a specific problem and a real industry (Davis 2003; Heers 2003; Milton 2004; Chebel 2007), comprising different categories (Chebel 2007). If not ransomed, the captives represented little interest, due to the development of sailboats at the expense of galleys, which had previously employed great numbers of slave rowers. In Salé, there were few galleys because they were not suitable for the Atlantic Ocean and because economic development was leaving little room for servile work. Apart from skilled workmen who were invited to deny their faith and gain their freedom, young boys destined to be converted and young women to become concubines and wives, most captives were not seen as a workforce but as an investment that reaped more value once liquidated and renewed. The price of a captive on the slave market varied according to sex, age, strength, and skills (metallurgy, armament, shipbuilding were among the favored sectors, with in addition those sectors in which western European industry had made superior progress), but mainly according to social status, which determined the amount of the ransom. Those with a good financial situation had the potential to be quickly ransomed (diplomats, consuls, nobles, wealthy merchants, and captains, for example) at highly variable prices; the others could choose to convert, or to buy their freedom after several years of work. In 1704, 29% of the captives were ransomed within 5 years (Mathiex 1954). The other captives were treated in various and unpredictable manners. Therefore, some practiced as captives the same trade that they had as free men. They held various jobs, like helmsman, sail tailor, boatswain, surgeon, and worked on the construction and maintenance of the ships (Mouette 1683). Others, paying a monthly fee, could exercise independent businesses as innkeepers, doctors, merchants, and so on, and eventually buy their freedom. The less fortunate were assigned to hard labor as slaves (Bennett 1960; Friedman 1983). They ended up as galley slaves or worked in Meknes on the construction of the palace of Moulay Ismail (1645–1727): 'We have our feet in iron chains and we work every day under the high heat carrying rocks and mortar'.[33] They were up to 2000 people assigned to such work. Some were ransomed through religious institutions such as redemptive missions, for example, in France, the Order of the Most Holy Trinity for the Redemption of captives, also called the order of Trinitarians or Mathurins (Larquié 1980). Stories from captives, as well as the records of religious missions regarding the ransoming and freeing of captives abound in the seventeenth century. While some are reliable, others are purely fictional, aiming to impress the population and especially to collect funds.

Although Salé was for many years a sort of promised land for newcomers, as illustrated by the growth and highly divers origins of its population during the seventeenth century, with banished Moriscos, Hornacheros, Jews, Christians, renegades, seamen from northern Europe, Levantines, and native people, it was far from the idealized image of a pirate utopia built on the reduction of social inequalities and a new hierarchical system. Different communities which often had different laws and different economic and political powers, were living close to each other but in separate districts. What we had is rather a capitalist city of privateers organized according to a strict pecking order – a plutocratic merchant city. Alongside the Hornacheros and Moriscos, the largest social group was no doubt the newly converted Muslims, also called renegades or 'Uluj' meaning professional Muslims or opportunists. Furthermore, while critical authors write about 'the Pirate Republic of Salé in the

seventeenth century', implying that it lasted for a long time, strictly speaking, the republic actually only lasted for 14 years.

Commercial raiding: an integrated political and economic capitalist system

Far from the rule of the Empires, Salé was described as a TAZ. If we consider the definition of this type of structure: 'a TAZ manifests itself to he who can see it, "appearing – disappearing" to avoid detection by the State. It occupies a place in space, in time, or in your mind and dissolves the moment it has been recorded' (Lamborn Wilson 1997, back cover), this was not the case of Salé and its pirate ships which were not only well known throughout Africa and Europe, but were economically and politically integrated and backed up by an international trading network.

Ships and the city

At the forefront of the port's economy there was a thriving shipbuilding industry, involving the construction of 15 vessels per year and the conversion into pirate vessels of the captured merchant ships. Then, there were the downstream activities, supplying ships, the marine jobs: sailors, rowers, soldiers, gunners, pilots … (2000 men enlisted in the seventeenth century). The loot from raiding was often cleared, benefiting the ship owners. As ships required significant costs for the armament and raiding, commercial raiding was placed in the hands of a merchant aristocracy: the Hornacheros. The Jihad on sea, taking the form of commercial raiding, seemed to be the easiest way to achieve integration for the renegades and the Moriscos. Progressively, other categories got involved in commercial raiding, for instance, Jewish merchants, governors, and even companies, based on joint ownership (Caillé 1949). Commercial raiding became everyone's business, and even ordinary people contributed to these shipping companies.[34] Although not everybody's livelihoods depended on it, everybody made a profit out of it:

> Even the pittance of the poorest muleteer of the city, or the cleanliness of the streets, let alone construction sites, costly mosques, villas of the rich, the water supply systems. (Braudel 1966, 206)

City of Salé and the world

As in all corsair cities, raiding was not the only activity. It is embedded with domestic and international trade. The same shipowners were chartering vessels for both raiding and trade depending on the season, the city's political alliances and the search for risk diversification, making Salé both a commercial and corsair city. There were plenty of French, English, and Dutch ships bringing the goods demanded by the Moroccans, who didn't have a commercial fleet. Privateering made this traffic necessary. On the one hand, Morocco could not do without many European goods, and on the other the privateers would have had much difficulty selling the spoils that had no buyer on the spot without the close and consistent complicity of European merchants and of the networks of receivers that shipped the goods at a good profit to ports that offered wider opportunities, like Cadiz, or the French ports (Brunot 1921). (p)
In exchange, wood, wool, soap, silks, and arms were imported from Holland, England and France. The redemption of captives was also a trade that required networks in which the Jewish merchants played an important role through their connections in Europe. Smuggling had always been rife in the seventeenth century and Salé was part of the Moroccan port system.

Moreover, neither ships nor cities, whether they are pirates or privateers, can operate on their own. Ships need the help of friendly ports that provide the resources for their refueling, maintenance, and repairs, the tolerance of the authorities or the absence of any authority, and the ability to sell the catch. So, a string of ports was involved in the larger game of raiding, from both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, from Morocco and abroad and from Veere in Zeeland to Mogador in the south. They did not play the same role. Some were auxiliary bases, technical stops, fall-back bases such as Larache, Safi, Tangier, the islands of Baiona in Galicia, and others. Tetouan was a commercial hub because of its relations with the trade centers of Europe and its central role in the redemption of captives. Trade networks developed and multiplied with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, and with the main trading and banking centers of the moment – Livorno, Marseille, London, and Amsterdam – for the clearing of looted goods as well as for purchasing arms supplies. Raiding activities were also encouraging a war supplies trade. Even if a papal rescript forbade supplying a Muslim country with weapons, ammunition and anything else that could be used to make war at sea, the Catholic nations hardly ever complied. In addition, the Netherlands, enemies of Spain and England, were major suppliers of arms.

Apart from the fact that Salé's military powers were allied to the Barbary regencies of Algiers and Tunis, it was recognized by the European powers, some of which had placed consuls there. It had a diplomatic network with which it signed numerous agreements, truces, peace treaties and trade deals, notably with France, the Dutch Republic and with England. These countries even used to pay tolls and ensured an almost constant supply of munition and war supplies to Salé, to ward off the attentions of the Salé pirates, each nation being secretly pleased about the losses suffered by the opposing navy.

Thus, the République of Salé not only became the main port of Morocco but it was also a large cosmopolitan port. The privateers of Salé and the town were thus well integrated and completely visible within the Mediterranean and European commercial, financial and political networks of the time and not at all a TAZ. 'appearing – disappearing' to avoid detection by the State.

A flourishing capitalist activity nonetheless

The raiding activities required heavy investment, were stimulated by greed, but what was their profitability and who reaped the benefits from them? In a pirate utopia, at sea the profits, or 'booty' would be distributed equitably. This equal sharing of property taken from the merchants by-passed the rules of capitalism. Through their privateering and related activities, the Salé pirates also accumulated much wealth. Indeed, besides the flow of monies associated with the redemption of captives, their trade was successful; they grew rich by selling goods imported from Europe, then by buying cheaply those brought by the privateers, in order to sell them to European traders. To this must be added smuggling as a means of circumventing interdictions from the pope and certain governments, as well as miscellaneous expenses amounting to 17–32% for the benefit of the authorities (harbor fees, franking privileges, bribes …), all involving an extensive network of in-between traffickers. This stimulated the port industries, including constructions and ship repairs; such activities employed 2000 men on ships every year while the captured goods market transformed Salé into a big cosmopolitan market. The people of Salé and the Europeans became accustomed to this

coexistence of raiding and trading and many ship-owners and merchants and even the European consuls got involved in this trade:

> Consuls and merchants are becoming rich mostly from the looted goods that pirates gain from the Christians, which they buy at a low price in order to return it to Europe, where they earn four times over, namely what is not useful in the country, as are most of the goods sent from America, wine, brandies, beers, oranges, oils and salt-cured meat and fish. (Mouette 1683, 708)

All this had brought wealth to the city of Salé and created jobs at all levels (sailors, ship building local traders, etc …). It is on this point that our conclusions converge with those of Lamborn Wilson (1995). But this wealth was to the benefit of only a small sector of society, namely the ship-owners Hornacheros, to some extent the Moriscos, the governors or the rich merchants. In fact, the privateering activity of Salé, like all privateering, was a lottery in which most of the gains went to the ship-owners, the captains and the governors:

> Gorged with profits, the sponsors and the ra'is use the money, as they make people work, and build; the whole population gets richer from the trade of looted goods and from the slave trade; the return of the fleet gives motion to the large annual economic pulsation, just like in Venice the arrival of the galleys of Alexandria or of the galleons to Seville. (Monlaü 1964, 91)

Conclusions/discussion

Salé, a plutocracy of privateers (q)

Even if Lamborn Wilson admits that Salé was 'not a pure pirate utopia'(1995, 148), and that: 'It's true that this teoria or vision of the pirates must be suspect as a prolongation of my own particular subjectivity, and even as a romantic prolongation' (1995, 202), we have to take our analysis further. There is no doubt that Salé was the promised land for new 'self-made men' of the seventeenth century. It was above all its religious freedom and ethnic and professional diversity that made it so particular. In fact, while the Republic, in its pure form only lasted fourteen years, with a population of around fifteen thousand and a dozen privateer ships, it was based on an unequal class system both ashore and aboard the ships as part of market relations. The question remains of whether Salé was a privateer or a pirate city. The Republic of Salé was far from Defoe's ideal pirate city of 'Libertalia' and from its modern reinterpretations. It was neither a privateering town like Dunkirk or Saint Malo placed under the authority of the crown, nor a Mediterranean regency like Algiers or Tunis focused on trade and raiding, as it was not dependent on the Turkish sultan. Very much involved in the highly profitable trade of captives, the Republic of Salé was close to a maritime city state like Venice and Amsterdam. A plutocracy, it was integrated into a commercial and financial international network that favored its development. Although some individuals could quickly climb the rungs of society, the search for profit, and integration with official trading networks, social inequality, hierarchical distribution of the loot, and the constant fight for power were more significant than the circumstantial presence of a few individual cases of social success, and presents a picture far from that of a pirate republic.

We may ask in this case why this particular merchant city developed such a libertarian reputation. We may consider various reasons. Alongside the adventures de Robinson Crusoe, the Pirates of Salé still remain a fascinating part of our collective imaginary. The period corresponding to the Republic of Salé (1627–1641/1666) corresponds to the golden age of Caribbean piracy (1650–1730). Morocco is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean and is more or

less on the same latitude as the Caribbean. Like many other utopia, the Republic of Salé is located in a mysterious country (with all that is conjured up by Africa, Muslims, Sufism, renegades, etc.) that is far away in space and time, outside the limits of central government and the major powers, while also being a real historic fact. We can thus skim over this episode without making too many direct contradictions and consider it as a case of a pirate utopia. Furthermore, it was a multicultural city composed of Europeans, Africans, Jews, Muslims, Christians, renegades and so on which added to the image of a libertarian community.

Historic truth or imagination? Why does historical 'truth' matter?

In epistemological terms, what is the status of history and what is the relation between history and truth? There is a certain duality about history, which is both a science with an obligation to relate the truth, and a form of narration – a literary process whose aim is to convince. The scientist leanings toward history in the late nineteenth century, as seen in the writings of Fustel de Coulanges (1888) or Langlois and Seignobos (1898) no longer apply. From the historian's point of view, what is true is what corresponds as much as possible to what really exists or has existed, or in other words it is a question of 'matching knowledge with reality' Pomian (1989, 114). Indeed there are no facts in history (Febvre 1952). There are no 'raw' facts and historians only have access to the various traces that have been left by the past. It is then up to the historian to make a choice and construct the plot: 'Facts do not exist in isolation, such that the fabric of history is what we will call a plot, a highly human and not very "scientific" combination of material causes, ends and chance' (Veyne 1971, 51), leaving the historian with the 'impossible task of fulfilling three goals at once: narrative, scientific and political' (Rancière 1993, 45). We admit that history should be considered as much a science as an art, and that its narrative dimension contains a certain desire to engage the reader.

As for Durkheim or Lévi-Strauss, they reject any claims of history to be scientific for reasons of ideography while the 'Annals' school distances itself from event-based history (Bloch 1993). According to them, history is no more related to reality than fiction and can be classified in the same way. They reduce history to rhetoric, to poetics and call into question the fact that it can have any link with reality and claim to tell the truth. The processes put in place by historians, supposedly to make their assertions controllable, in fact only serve to make the reader believe that the accounts proposed are true (Pomian 1989), truth here being more akin to trumpery. The positions taken by Linguistic turn or the 'Narrativistes', and the Historic turn in our field of study, are sometimes even more radical: 'the basic idea of modern theory of historiography is the denial that historical writing refers to an actual historical past' (Iggers 1997, 118). For these movements, history is just another narrative genre in which 'truth' is dependent upon the stated or unstated theoretical or philosophical framework employed by the historian. We may also mention the concept of hyper-reality of the philosopher Jean Baudrillard (1981) and the Situationist movement according to which reality is nothing other than a spectacle (Debord [1967] 2002, 1988 1988) in which reality and fiction are combined. It is in the above context that we can situate Lamborn Wilson (1995, 16) and his 'piratology' (cf supra). Taking his inspiration from Nietzsche, he presents his choices and retraces his itinerary in a sort of 'ego-history' (Nora 1987; Duby 1991), even inventing a new word to characterize his methodology: 'piratology':

> We've certainly had to use our imagination more than a 'real' historian would allow, erecting a lot of suppositions on a shaky framework of generalizations, and adding a touch of fantasy (and what piratologist has ever been able to resist fantasy?). I can only say that I've satisfied my own curiosity at least to this extent: That something like a Renegado culture could have existed; that all the ingredients for it were present, and contiguous, and synchronic. (Lamborn Wilson 1995, 187)

We do not consider ourselves as 'antiquarians', that is to say finding the past interesting for its own sake, and admit that it is well worthwhile, as suggested by Historic Turn, to take the socio-economic environment into account and study new types of archives such as biographies and verbal accounts or as yet little explored alternative aspects (gender, homosexuality, micro-history, etc.) and new sectors of research. We are sensitive to such calls, as published in this review (Mills et al. 2016; Smith and Russell 2016) and in other reviews (Suddaby 2016). Our study itself, in which participated a historian and a manager, belongs in the field of micro-history as it explores the socio-economic organization of a small city and the management systems on its privateer ships. We could throw caution to the wind and fall into total skepticism, but nevertheless follow a middle course with regard to the concept of truth as proposed by such historians and philosophers as De Certeau (1975), Ricoeur (1955, 1983, 1985), Pomian (1989) Chartier (1998). There are some facts that cannot be reduced to a sort of historic subjectivity (Ricoeur 1983). We must therefore isolate anything that intellectually makes history a social science: 'historic rationale' as presented in particular by Jablonka (2014).

While the materials on which the historian bases his arguments are diverse, the obligation of truth should be understood as the respect the historian should have for the remaining traces of the past, such as archives which can be ignored by a novelist but not by a historian. In this regard, we can speak of a historical science. Being aware of the difficulty of objectivity in history is, for the historian, an invitation to exercise extra caution and a warning to watch one's step. There are also some safeguards for historians against fantasy (Leduc 2008). Historians must first of all be professional, use reference notes, list their sources … They must then double check their sources and critically review them both externally (with regard to their authenticity and origin) and internally (their interpretation and credibility), their work is conducted under the critical eye of their fellow scholars and new studies could always call it into question, 'falsify' it according to Popper. While a work of history may not be 'true', it (r) can be capable of 'verisimilitude' while remaining 'falsifiable'. Once we stop considering history as a nomothetic science from which universal laws can be deduced, and thereafter predictions and prophesies, which would reduce it to historicism, or 'practical dogmatism' as Comte-Sponville (1994) calls it, there is a stance that could satisfy Popperian epistemology, which is to consider it as an idiographic science, regarding an individual fact. It involves using real-life accounts and archives, which can be verified, to construct hypotheses on the causes of a situation that the historian is seeking to explain (Boyer 1992). History does not operate like any other form of discourse, but is subject to criticism with truth as the yardstick. It thus offers a means of resisting fashion and sophism.

History, historical fiction, and utopia

While narration is part of history, accounts of events are used as a means of representation which must not take over other aspects of the historian's work, such as reading, analyzing

and cross-checking sources, and presenting concepts; there is also their metadiscourse which serves to verify what is said and the retrodiction of quantitative models, etc. History is not therefore 'better' or 'superior' than historic fiction or Utopian literature, it is simply something else. History is not fiction and fiction is not history; Aristote (2003, 1451b), himself made a distinction between history and poetry:

> A poet differs from a historian, not in that one writes verse and the other prose … but in that the historian relates what has happened, and the poet relates what could happen …'

On the one hand, historians since the late nineteenth century have warned us about what Langlois and Seignobos (1898) called 'literary ornaments', reminding us that one must never over-embellish: 'The purpose of history is not to entertain or give us practical guidelines for how to behave, or to inspire emotion, but to know' (263). According to Jablonka (2014) 'narration is not the fetters of history, its necessary evil; on the contrary, it is one of its most powerful resources' (139) and it is 'in narration rather than against it, that research is deployed' (276). He concludes that 'it is therefore possible to build a bridge between the social sciences and literature without regressing towards the system of classical literature nor towards post-modern scepticism'. (249).

On the other hand, the historic novel or Utopic literature need to be verisimilar and be 'just as it happened' in order to satisfy the reader. Historic novelists seek to create a realistic effect by using the preterite tense:

> A work of fiction is quasi-historical in that the fictitious events it relates are past events as narrated to the reader: this is how they resemble past events and how fiction resembles history. (Ricoeur 1985, 342)

They however differ from history:

> History is thus opposed to what may be or is a fake or falsified and unreal representation of the past, to Utopia, to imaginary history, to the historic novel, to myths, folklore … this clichéd image of the past. (Marou 1954, 30)

How can utopias serve management?

We must not however reject the imaginary world of the Salé Republic (1627–1666) and the lessons it holds for management. The history of the republic of Salé gave us the opportunity to reflect on the role of utopias and their part in imagining alternative organizations and forms of management.

Management utopias are based on accounts that must be consistent, both intrinsically and with the expectations of the public. What can be told depends on what is acceptable for the audience. We can therefore propose utopias, even if we know they are not true, and some utopias even become true simply because those that hear about them believe in them. Even if they are historically inaccurate, utopias thus facilitate the coordination of actions and make discussion possible. Isn't truth dependent on dreams as a temporary means to attain other realities yet unknown? While ideology gives legitimacy to what is real, a utopia could be seen as a critical alternative to what exists, a means of exploring or imagining what is possible (Ricoeur 2016). The imagination frees our minds from the everyday and allows us to strive towards a utopia, taken not as something that does not exist anywhere and is tantamount to a pipe dream, but as something that does not yet exist, but will become a reality in the future. It becomes the concept of what is real, resulting from a realistic vision

(Comte-Sponville 2014). Accepting the use of utopian fiction could thus be necessary in order to distance oneself from the present:

> It might be said that this is bad history because it clearly confuses the reality of piracy with the stories of Captain Johnson. But, as I have shown, these confusions go back to the earliest accounts and so, perhaps we should be wary of over privileging the economic and real history? In the creation of a moral economy and a distinctly radical culture, the pirates political legacy has been long lasting and has made a significant contribution to the development of the contemporary culture of radical anti-capitalist and anarchist dissident. (Land 2007, 190)

As a utopia the pirate republic of Salé may be still significant for management as it offers sources of alternative forms of organization which have the advantage of being free from the illusion of progress and social improvement (Keucheyan 2008), conveys a desire for freedom and democracy (Land 2007) and thus provides solutions to the limitations of existing models (Lamborn Wilson 1995; Rediker and Linebaugh 2000; Parker 2002a, 2002b; Rediker 2004). In management, utopia may be a powerful counter-discourse to the managerial vision of the good life – ordered by a benign hierarchy of authorities (Reedy 2002):

> Utopianism is also, perhaps, a word that suggests that organizational arrangements, particularly those naturalized as market managerialism, are a form of politics made durable. If we can begin to see the political assumptions built into the present way in which we organize ourselves more clearly, then we can also begin to think about alternative politics built into alternative structures. (Parker 2002b, 212)

A Utopia is nevertheless a perfect society in which there is no need for change: its attainment would mark the end of history (Comte-Sponville 2014). In addition, while it may appear essential to distance oneself from the present in order to be able to describe in as concrete terms as possible what could be the reality of tomorrow, or what is simply not fully realizable, but rather a counter-reality which allows us to consider what exists, we must not 'do away with' history and assume it to be fiction. While there is nothing wrong with just making up inspiring stories and if utopian speculation plays a positive role in the generation of alternatives, we must admit that a utopia, situated in an imaginary country, detached from history, from the dull weight of 'truth' and therefore from possible criticism of its presuppositions or its falsifications to use Popper's terms, would become even more powerful. Fiction that is accepted for what it is would be more powerful that a false reality to which we ascribe what does not exist.

What lessons for management?

Firstly, the institutions of the Republic of Salé during the period from 1627 to 1641/1666 were the fruit of an extraordinary geographical, political and religious situation, both in relation to Morocco and to Europe. As regards the form of management on the privateer ships, it resulted both from the social organization of the city, its crew being composed of slaves, captives taken by both renegades and Muslims under the orders of a captain that was often himself a renegade, appointed by rich ship-owners and filling both their pockets and those of the town, and from religion which dominated life on board the ship. The geographical factors that made the Moroccan-built ships smaller with no galley crew and a general lack of space made the hierarchical distances less apparent, allowing a sort of humanity to reign on board. On the other hand, the more or less romanticized organization of the pirates of the golden age of Caribbean piracy (1650–1725) was also the fruit of an

extraordinary geographic, political, colonial and religious situation, both in the Americas and in Europe at the same period. We have therefore two cases in which a melting-pot of Europeans far from home, engaged in more or less the same activities, introduced radically different institutions and management systems in two remote parts of the world. Both cases came to an end however for almost the same reasons: The strengthening of central power and peace between the great European powers, meant that their maritime forces were henceforth directed toward the pirates that may have temporarily served them, safety on the seas being in times of peace a driver for economic development. What the pirates of the Caribbean and the Salé privateers have in common however, is that once signed up, the hierarchy and authority of the captain could not be disputed, and the punishment for transgressing this rule would be as merciless and cruel in both cases.

What these observations offer with regard to management is that the type of management depends on many factors. If we are inspired by some of these methods, however romanticized they may be, we can see that undisputed authority and discipline are necessary in times of crisis, irrespective of whether their legitimacy is imposed or elected.

Notes

1. Peter Lamborn Wilson, who could also be Hakim Bey, is an American political writer known for his theories on temporary autonomous zones (TAZ), his writings on mysticism and hacker culture, and for his incentives for poetic terrorism. He is considered the ideological father of hackers.
2. Among these authors, those that follow the trend of 'Atlantic history', which is a specialty field in history that studies the Atlantic World in the early modern period, try to demonstrate that modern democracy was not born in Europe, but in North America.
3. Exquemelin, son of a Protestant apothecary, was born in Harfleur in Normandy (France). After studying in Holland, where he became a surgeon, he enlisted in July 1666 in the Dutch navy. After his ship was captured by pirates in the Caribbean, he was sold with the rest of the crew to other pirates, but managed to escape after three years. Becoming a pirate himself, he was for eight years ship surgeon at the service of pirates including Henry Morgan.
4. The scholarly edition of the work of Alexandre-Olivier Exquemelin: *Histoire des aventuriers flibustiers* by Real Ouellet and Patrick Villiers (Ouellet and Villiers 2005) shows, from their study of archives, that around fifty per cent of the work published in 1688 was based on pure fantasy. Camus (1990) also shows that while Exquemelin actually existed, there is no one edition of this work that can be considered truer than others to the lost manuscripts of Exquemelin, which have been adapted by successive publishers. Exquemelin was not the author of all the chapters of the 1699 edition, some of which were embellished or invented. Neither did he take part in all the expeditions related in this edition.
5. Daniel Defoe, whose real name was Daniel Foe, was an English adventurer who was born in 1659 or 1660 and died in April 1731. In politics, he attacked in several virulent pamphlets the unpopular government of James II of England, and contributed to the revolution of 1688.
6. According to Patrick Villiers, Professor of History at the Université du Côte d'Opale (France), the inventories now having been completed, the French archives do not contain any documents from the Indian Ocean that make the slightest reference to Libertalia or to the pirates of Madagascar at the time when Libertalia was supposed to exist.
7. The complete title is: 'The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Robinson Crusoe of York, Mariner: Who lived Eight and Twenty Years, all alone in an un-inhabited Island on the coast of America, near the Mouth of the Great River of Oroonoque; Having been cast on Shore by Shipwreck, where-in all the Men perished but himself. With An Account of how he was at last strangely deliver'd by Pyrates'.
8. Note that a 'corsair' in English is a Barbary pirate while in French it refers to a privateer.

9. Do or Die is a group of English libertarians.
10. Anarchists do not see anarchy as chaos, but a harmonious situation resulting from the abolition of the State and all forms of exploitation between human beings. This is why they preferred to be called Libertarians.
11. Every corporation (bakers, locksmiths, carpenters, roofers, etc.) would be organized to provide aid to those of their fellows who had less than most. The idea was adopted by Colbert in 1673, when he set up two hospitals (Rochefort and Toulon) to provide free health care, invalidity, and old age pensions for seamen. They had to contribute to the funding of this early welfare system by giving part of their revenues (6 deniers for each pound, or 2.5%) (Dubarry, Peny, and Hervier 1979).
12. Their name is derived from *Moro* (or Moor), an inhabitant of North Africa.
13. A Barbary Regency meant a small Muslim state located on the coast of Africa, which was ruled through delegation by the sultan of Constantinople.
14. Morat Raïs is a Dutch sailor who, after his capture by Barbary corsairs in 1618, had converted to Islam. He subsequently became 'Grand Admiral' of the Republic of Salé. Regarding his singular career, see Maziane 2013.
15. Additional bibliographic references will be given where possible in the footnotes.
16. See, for example, the pirate raids led by Edward Thatch who was more commonly known as Blackbeard (Konstam 2007).
17. For example, the successful raid on Rio de Janeiro by a French squadron placed under the orders of the privateer Duguay-Trouin to capture the port of Rio de Janeiro in September 711.
18. Philip Gosse, cited in Maziane (1999, 222).
19. Round vessels, square-rigged sailing ships used in the Atlantic.
20. The ships used by the pirates of Salé included brigantines, xebecs, polaccas, and frigates with lateen sails.
21. Memoir of Jean-Baptiste Estelle, 26 September 1698, *SIHM*., France, t. IV, 672; Memoir of Jean-Baptiste Estelle, early October 1698, *SIHM*., *ibid*., T. IV, 705.
22. It is the same as the amount paid to the king of France by the French privateers.
23. See Rodger (1986) and Mollat (1975) for this development. Their reference to possession of a letter of marque is nevertheless fragile. These letters were the subject of trafficking; also, during the raids, peace treaties, and war declarations could be made. One could quickly turn from one status to another, even unintentionally.
24. The term Barbary pirates was coined in Europe to designate the pirates and privateers from the Barbary coast, the former name of the southern coasts of the African continent, to the west of Egypt, between Morocco and Libya. They extended along the Mediterranean coast and part of the Atlantic coast.
25. Sidi M'hamed el-Maliki ez-Zeyani el-Ayachi (1563–1641), more commonly called Al-Ayachi, surnamed 'The Saint of Salé', was a Moroccan marabout and a powerful military leader.
26. Moroccan Sufi brotherhood that thrived during the early seventeenth century. It was founded around 1566 by Sidi Mohammed ben Boubker Amhaouch Addilaï bin Said (1536–1612) in Dila, on the territory of the present rural town of Ait Ishak, 22 km south of Kenifra. The Zawiya began to grow and spread among the Amazigh tribes in the Middle and High Atlas. It then had a spiritual and cultural influence over a large part of Morocco and, thanks to the decline of Saadians, went as far as to claim the sultanate in the person of Muhammad Al-Hajj between 1641 and 1663.
27. In the seventeenth century, in order to open the gates of the city of Fès, Moulay er-Rachid took Taza. He became the first sultan of the Alaouite dynasty, still in power today.
28. The Italian word 'corso' designates the business of the commercial ships of the Infidels. While it can be likened to privateering, the 'corso' has a fundamental difference: it was an ongoing religious battle between Christians and Muslims, or more precisely between Christians and the Barbary pirates. Its religious motivations differentiate it from simple commercial raiding.
29. Born out of the religious problems of reformation and counter-reformation in the German Empire, the conflict spread to all of Western Europe. Later, the promulgation of the 'Navigation Act' in 1651 led to a war between England and the Netherlands.

30. Traité entre Sidi Mohammed El-'Ayyachi et Charles I, du 13 mai 1637, SIHM. 1ère s. Angl, I, T. III, 290; M. AL-IFRÂNÎ, *Nozhet el-Hâdî ou Histoire de la dynastie sa'dienne au Maroc (1511–1670)*, Paris, éd. Houdas, Publ., Ecole des langues orientales, 3e série, Vol. II–III, 1888–1889, 444.
31. In turn, the people of New Salé called them 'Kayihmakon fi-l-asr', that is: 'they become mad during the evening prayer' (Brown 1971).
32. The story of a captive bought in Morocco containing the works of Christian slaves and other particulars of the court of said Emperor, of his government and of the customs of the country, written by himself (source quoted by Maziane 1999).
33. From a letter of Jacques Gosse from 20 August 1670, (source used in Maziane 1999).
34. Letter of M. Anselme to the consuls and governors of Marseille, 16 December 1617, Revue Africaine XXIII 1879, 67.

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Notes, comments, additions, and corrections. (2020)

(a) The 'commissions' from the Diwan were issued on the 'suggestion' of the Admiral and were not universally obtained. The Diwan was not the only authority to issue commissions as Claes Compaen issued commissions for his ships to harbor at Salé, Morat Raïs issued safe-conduct passes as well and estimates are that less than 50% of captains had one.

(b) Their 'fierceness' proved to be imaginary; their alleged dedication to attacking Spain does not agree with an analysis of the prizes taken but this is limited too as the ship owners are unknown.

(c) They were viewed by other Spanish residents, Christian & Muslim, as bandits or brigands. Other researchers state that the Andalusians spoke Castilian while those from Hornacho spoke a Hispano-Arabic blend known only amongst them. The Muslim population in Salé called them the 'Muslims of the Kasbah' meaning pseudo-Muslims.

(d) Zidan 'gave' them the right to live in Salé, not the kasbah. They occupied the derelict ruin of the Kasbah after being exiled from Salé since none of what Zidan offered was in his power to offer - taxes had not been paid to the Sultan since 1608.

(e) They assisted the Dutch who were the predominant force, 3000 in 1610.

(f) The history dates to 1590 when al-Mansur began granting tax-breaks to the Dutch and limited self-government. This became full self-government from 1608 with the formation of the Republic of coming in 1614. The Andalusian Republic of Rabat followed by 1618 and that of the Kasbah formed around 1621. These different times were, in part, a function of the different ruling powers that held sway north of the river versus those south of the river.

(g) The Horncheros were exiled to Tunis in 1627 and only allowed to return due to pressure from the English, in 1631.

(h) The Kasbah did maintain its former authority which was almost none when it came to running the Republic until their allowed return of their 4-yer exile in Tunis ended in 1631. After that they may have assumed more control in Rabat. By this point in time the area north of the Bou-Regreg was under the control of the Dila while everything to the south was under the control of a different party.

(i) Maybe; an Amazigh Sultan of the Dila was still ruling as late as 1673.

(j) Contemporary sources paint a picture of poverty for the Hornacho exiles; hence the need to take advantage of the worthless tax breaks offered by Zidan. It is a relatively new view that they had wealth, one that has suspiciously coincided with legal wrangling with the Spanish government over the issue of reparations due to descendants.

(k) Salé did not have any powerful Hornachero families until, at the earliest, the latter half of the 17th century.

(l) There were no *political and financial elite of Sale* that were Hornacheros. The myth of a Hornachero elite is Salé is a recent invention.

(m) Bennassar and Bennassar suffers from a lot of deficiencies in the applicability of the statistics they use as their population represents less than 5%, and I believe less than 1%, of the overall population; they also only involve those who appeared before the Inquistion Courts which is not a representative population.

(n) The Andalusians were derisively called the 'Christians of Castile'; the Hornacheros were derisively called the 'Muslims of the Kasbah' intimating that they were not faithfully following the tenets of Islam.

(o) They provided the majority of the capital required to finance a ship through loans.

(p) The Dutch held a virtual monopoly on moving the goods - the primary fence was Simon Danser, Junior and his chief rival, and successor, was Jan Jansen van Haarlem/Morat Raïs.

(q) The authors conflate the Republic of Salé (1608 – 1627?) with the Republic of Bou-Regreg (1627? – 1641). The latter was an amalgamation of the former plus the Republic of Rabat (1614 – 1627?) and the Hornachero's attempt at a republic (1617? – 1627?).

(r) This discussion on the critical review of information and the proper and thorough analysis of historical data is lost on these authors as to certain fallacies they relate as fact regarding Jan Jansen van Haarlem. One specific incident bears repeating: this paper maintains the fiction that Jan Jansen van Haarlem was captured in the Canary Islands in 1618 and at some point after that he was forced to convert to Islam. The source of this story was Jan himself who, in 1621, was trying to gain Dutch citizenship for the first time. He had been a citizen of the Spanish Netherlands when he left in the late 1590s. By 1601 he had taken a second wife Majora Abdlerhamen, and was using the name Morat-Raïs and was probably living in Cartagena in Murcia. As a Christian he could not marry while still married to his wife left behind, but as a Muslim, he could. Both of these changes – the new wife and the new name – are routinely observed happenings immediately subsequent to a conversion to Islam. While Cartagena may not be true, the first evidence in a contemporary record placing Jan in Murcia has surfaced. The earliest known record placing Jan in Morocco dates to 1609 and in Salé to 1614. When taking into account the trajectory of his life and career, it does not correspond with a conversion to Islam in 1618. Was he held captive in Algiers in 1618? Yes, he was. He was considered to be a citizen of a state that the Regency was at war with. Spain & the Netherlands jointly declared war on Algiers in that year and all Dutch nationals were placed under house arrest initially. For unknown reasons Jan gained his freedom and was in Morocco in 1620. Jan told this version of his past to a Dutch consul while trying to secure citizenship. As a Muslim, he could not claim Dutch citizenship unless (1) his conversion to Islam had been done under the threat of violence or harm; and (2) said conversion had to have occurred within the 3 previous years. Being apprised of these conditions well ahead of time, Jan concocted the story to fit the requirements. It did and he was eligible for Dutch citizenship though it is uncertain whether he ever accepted it as such. But the fact of his eligible status made his children, who were not born in the Netherlands and, as far as is known, never set foot there, eligible to claim Dutch citizenship since they were born to a Dutch father. Up to recent years, the matter of his residency in Cartagena was only theoretical and that story fit in well with the Dutch citizenship. The chances for his 4 sons to gain Dutch citizenship were better of they had a separate claim to that status as well. By giving Cartagena as their place of birth, Jan offered them this second, independent claim to Dutch citizenship. When the United Provinces were created, the law allowed for anyone living there or any citizen of Spanish-controlled lands to become a citizen of the United Provinces. While it can not be proved, one can assume that a person who would concoct the 'captured and forcibly converted' story would have little qualms in placing the birth of his children in Cartagena.

When considering the above, it is readily apparent that the 1618 story as presented in this paper, and in every other paper of the many published on this topic by one of the authors, is not accurate. The existence of his second family makes such a story highly unlikely at the very least. It is for this very reason I have spent years researching Jan Jansen to get at the truth. Understanding that stories such as the 1618 one do not just appear without reason but knowing that it could not be true as presented

spurred me on to locating the 17th century laws on Dutch citizenship and chasing down every hint, rumor, or scrap of information until the coherent picture emerged that did not dismiss any piece of the story but placed it in the context of what did Jan want to do at that time and in that place. While it may seem like a trifling matter to make such a declaration, it certainly was not. Had this information become available in the Islamic world, Jan would have been executed. This was not something one did without much forethought and planning and then executing it in such a way as to be nearly impossible to uncover. This last he did by promulgating his tale to a Dutch consul in at out-of-the-way location, one not frequented by many Muslims or, for that matter, many people that knew Jan. It was one of the consuls in a Hanseatic League city but exactly which one has not yet been found.

It is through this painstaking and time consuming research that the truth is uncovered. Now the difficulty is to make the truth known to the extent that it overcomes the myth that has been retold innumerable times as fact in this paper and the vast majority of all research published in the last 4 decades. Eventually the research findings will percolate into the public sector and the thousands of biographies on Jan Jansen van Haarlem will slowly be altered to reflect fact rather than fantasy.